The Supreme Court has reversed a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that the lower court improperly granted habeas relief to Jeremiah Sweeney based on a claim he never actually made. The case, *Terence Clark, Director, Prince George’s County Department of Corrections, et al. v. Jeremiah Antoine Sweeney*, centered on Sweeney’s conviction for second-degree murder and the subsequent appeals process.
Background of the Case
Jeremiah Sweeney was convicted in Maryland of second-degree murder and other related charges stemming from a shooting. The prosecution argued that Sweeney fired at neighbors during an argument about stolen marijuana, accidentally killing a bystander. A key point of contention at trial was whether Sweeney could have been the shooter given his location and the angle of the bullet.
During the trial, a juror, Juror 4, took it upon himself to visit the crime scene. After deliberations began, he shared his observations with the other jurors. The court and parties involved agreed to dismiss Juror 4 rather than declare a mistrial, and the remaining 11 jurors ultimately convicted Sweeney. Sweeney’s direct appeal was unsuccessful.
Sweeney’s Post-Conviction Efforts
Sweeney then pursued post-conviction relief in state court, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a voir dire (questioning) of the entire jury to determine if Juror 4’s unauthorized visit had prejudiced any other jurors. The state court denied this claim.
He then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, again arguing ineffective assistance of counsel on the same grounds. The Federal District Court also denied his petition, concluding that the state court’s decision on the ineffective assistance claim was not objectively unreasonable.
The Fourth Circuit’s Intervention
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision. However, the Fourth Circuit didn’t rule on the ineffective assistance claim that Sweeney actually presented. Instead, it concluded that a “combination of extraordinary failures from juror to judge to attorney” deprived Sweeney of his constitutional rights to confront witnesses and have an impartial jury. They ordered a new trial.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling
The Supreme Court, in a *per curiam* (by the court) opinion, strongly disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s approach. The Court emphasized the principle of “party presentation” in the adversarial legal system, stating that courts should act as neutral arbiters and decide cases based on the issues presented by the parties. Citing *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*, the Court reiterated that courts “call balls and strikes” and don’t get to “bat.”
The Supreme Court found that the Fourth Circuit had violated this principle by granting relief based on a claim Sweeney never asserted. Sweeney’s federal habeas petition focused solely on the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. The Fourth Circuit, instead of addressing that claim, essentially created a new one based on a broader assessment of alleged failures throughout the trial. The Supreme Court deemed this a “radical transformation” of Sweeney’s claim and an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case back to the lower court. The Fourth Circuit is now instructed to analyze the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that Sweeney actually presented, and to do so under the stringent standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to state court decisions unless they are “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The Supreme Court also noted that when assessing a *Strickland* claim (ineffective assistance of counsel) that a state court has already adjudicated, the analysis is “doubly deferential.”
In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of sticking to the issues presented by the parties in a legal case and respecting the established framework for federal review of state court decisions.

